If a country is willing to accept uncertainty in yield and the inefficient use of fissile material, there is probably no technical requirement for testing in the development of a conservatively designed simple fission weapon. Thus, the absence of testing can not be construed as an indication that a nation does not possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, most technical efforts at countering proliferation are intended to detect efforts to assemble technology and materials prior to the construction of a nuclear weapon and thus arrest development, rather than to discover the process after a device has been produced. So how does a CTBT contribute to nonproliferation?
- By prohibiting an emerging nuclear state from testing, to what degree do we limit its ability to develop nuclear weapons?
- By prohibiting all states from testing, to what degree do we strengthen the nonproliferation regime?
From the perspective of many non-nuclear states, a test ban is not just a technical tool for deterring the production of a nuclear weapon. Notwithstanding U.S. arguments about the role of nuclear testing for maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, many nations view testing both as a means of developing advanced nuclear weapons and as a mechanism for demonstrating power and resolve. Consequently, many non-nuclear states view testing as symbolic of the arms race because it equates national security to a nuclear deterrent and the capability to fight a nuclear war. They argue that such a relationship is anathema to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the foundation of which they believe is the premise that the reliance on nuclear weapons for national security is not forever. Efforts on the part of the nuclear weapon states to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation) are therefore viewed as hypocritical if those nations are simultaneously defending the need to develop more advanced weapons (vertical proliferation). As a result, many non-nuclear states perceive a CTBT as a sine qua non for strengthening the NPT regime and reducing its discriminatory nature. The link between a CTBT and NPT is made in the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 1970 NPT. Independent of the technical debate, the link is perceived as real to a great many non-nuclear states and consequently affects their actions and policies.
A prohibition on nuclear testing for all nations will prevent the development of more advanced nuclear weapons, de-emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons for national security, and reduce the discriminatory nature of the NPT regime. While nuclear testing is not a technical requirement for developing at least simple fissile weapons, a CTBT will provide an unambiguous context for strong international enforcement of the nonproliferation regime in which other, more direct, restrictions can be implemented.
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