Chapter 6: Summary and Recommendations

Recommendation #2: Maintain an operational system to meet U.S. national needs for the near real-time analysis of seismic events, the triggering of data retrieval from global networks, and the issuing of alerts of nuclear detonations.

• A quick determination of a possible nuclear detonation is needed to trigger the collection of data from global and regional networks. In addition, near real-time monitoring is necessary to access non-seismological corroborative data and on-site inspections.

• While seismology may provide the backbone of a monitoring effort, it must be tied to photo reconnaissance, communications intelligence, effluent sampling, and other intelligence methods to provide a monitoring capability greater than the sum of its parts. Consequently, a federal organization that can access all such information should have responsibility for the quick monitoring task.

• The responsibilities for quick reporting and the full listing of global seismic events need to be independent because their requirements are not fully compatible. For example, instantaneous access to data sources characterized by high reliability, standardization, and low-noise are the desirable features for an operational reporting network. Coverage and joint cooperation with foreign scientific establishments through locally operated stations are more important for the global "neighborhood watch" program and a more complete understanding of regional seismicity.

• The location of certain seismic stations and the specific analysis criteria used to identify nuclear weapons tests may need to be classified.

• Following direction from General Eisenhower in 1947 to "detect atomic explosions anywhere in the world", the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) acquired responsibility for the monitoring of nuclear weapons testing.

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  To implement...

• An independent review should evaluate the appropriate agency to lead the U.S. CTBT monitoring effort. That agency should be given adequate support to ensure that they have a strong seismological capability and that they are not influenced by any institutional conflicts of interest.

• Oversight of the U.S. monitoring effort should be provided by an independent panel of scientific experts.

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  Nuclear Testing and Nonproliferation

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