Verification never can be accomplished with 100% certainty. Decisions concerning verification therefore involve making judgments about acceptable levels of risk. Such judgments, in turn, can only be made by weighing the potential costs of undetected cheating against the expected benefits of the proposed treaty. As discussed earlier, the problem of monitoring becomes increasingly difficult as the magnitude threshold decreases. At lower magnitudes, there are more naturally occurring earthquakes, industrial explosions, and means of evading a monitoring system. Eventually, there will be a level below which we have little confidence in monitoring nuclear tests.28
A CTBT is considered verifiable (as many other treaties have been considered verifiable) if it is determined that the advantages of the treaty outweigh the significance of any undetected clandestine testing (should it occur) below the monitoring capability. Through a similar cost-benefit analysis, the United States will have to determine the level of resources we wish to apply toward increasing the confidence at which we monitor small seismic events around the world. Ultimately, the monitoring capability will be determined by how effectively resources can be applied to the task. To use the resources of the seismological community effectively, the following criteria should be used:
1. Make use of all available resources - both technical and intellectual
The scientific community is a large resource that can contribute to monitoring with little additional cost. Seismic stations with readily accessible high-quality data will greatly increase not only the data available for monitoring purposes, but also the number of scientists who indirectly assist in the monitoring task. By having more scientists and more data contributing to the monitoring task, open seismic stations will enhance the enforcement of a CTBT by creating the technological equivalent of a global "neighborhood watch".
2. Create an environment that will encourage aggressive problem-solving.
The erroneous U.S. charge of Soviet violations of the 150 kiloton limit of the TTBT in the 1980's, and the 14 year stagnation over the verification provisions of the treaty, are examples of how technical issues can be derailed by institutional conflicts of interest.29 In both these cases, organizations opposed to further restrictions on nuclear testing were charged with determining whether such treaties could be verified. If progress is to be made, there must be an environment free of institutional conflicts of interest, competing requirements, and direct political influence.
3. To the extent possible, use technologies with multiple applications that can be installed on a cost-sharing basis.
It is unlikely that budgetary pressures will decrease in the future. If data collected as part of a monitoring system also can contribute to earthquake hazards mitigation and our understanding of the Earth's structure, the monitoring system can be installed and operated on a cost-sharing basis. By creating seismic networks that have multiple applications and a broadly based scientific rationale, more scientists will be using the data and therefore, a wider expertise will be applied indirectly to the monitoring task.
4. Create a system that is both adaptable and sustainable.
Changes in global politics, can occur quickly; and countries not of proliferation concern today may be of concern tomorrow. A global monitoring system should have a open and adaptable architecture that can accommodate both growth and shifting national security needs.
In the next chapter, we cross-reference these criteria with the resources of the seismological community to suggest how these resources can be best applied to the monitoring of a CTBT in the context of proliferation.
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Return to: Chapter II: Overall Assessment for Clandestine Testing
Continue to:Chapter III