Chapter 1: The Relationship Between a CTBT and Proliferation


Chapter 1 Footnotes

1. See "Trinity - a reminiscence" by George B. Kistiakowsky, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1980.
2. One kiloton was originally defined as the explosive equivalent of 1000 tons of TNT. This definition was found to be imprecise and so the term was redefined to be the release of 1012 calories of explosive energy. The largest weapon ever tested was a 50 megaton (Mt) (1 megaton = 1000 kilotons) weapon that the Soviets exploded 3.5 kilometers above Novaya Zemlya on October 30, 1961. For comparison, the total tonnage of bombs dropped during World War II was approximately two Mt, and during the Vietnam War it was approximately 6.3 Mt. (principally due to the large B-52 bomber).
3. Letter from J. Robert Oppenheimer to General Groves referenced in "Reactor-Grade Plutonium's Explosive Properties", by J. Carson Mark, Nuclear Control Institute Report, August 1990, p.4.
4. From The Making of the Atomic Bomb, by Richard Rhodes (New York: Simon and Shuster).
5. The height of detonation determines the size of the intersection between the blast sphere and the ground, and therefore is determined from the expected yield. The Target Committee minutes state that for the Nagasaki Implosion device "With the present information the fuse would be set at 2,000 tons equivalent but fusing for other values should be available at the time of final delivery...Trinity data will be used for this gadget." See Rhodes, p.631.
6. Estimating that the yield of Trinity would be about one kiloton, Kistiakowsky chose to watch the explosion from what he determined to be the safe distance of five miles, only to be knocked over by the 20 kiloton explosion.
7. See for example, Truman, by David McCullough, (New York; Simon & Schuster, 1992).
8. After J. Carson Mark; Ray Kidder at "The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of Underground Testing" sponsored by the IRIS Consortium, Princeton, NJ, Nov.11-13, 1992; The Los Alamos Primer, The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb, annotated by Robert Serber, University of California Press, 1992; and Announced United States Nuclear Tests, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/NV-209 (Rev.12), May 1992, UC-700.
9. "Russian/Soviet Weapons Secrets Revealed", by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.49, no.3, April 1993, p.48.
10. "End Testing, Stem the Bomb's Spread", by Gerard Smith, Arms Control Today, vol.20, no.9, p.9-11. Nov. 1990.
11. Through much of the 1980's Deng Xiaoping kept defense fourth among his four modernizations, after agriculture, industry, and science. Since 1990, defense spending has doubled. See "Asia Unleashed", The Economist, April 3, 1993.
12. See for example "U.S. Said to Drop Plan for 9 Tests of Nuclear Arms" by Douglas Jehl, The New York Times, June 30, 1993, p. A1.
13. In addition, the negotiating record of the NPT indicates an even stronger expectation on the part of the non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers will conclude a CTBT.
14. On August 5, 1988, the 25th anniversary of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Peru, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Venezuela called for a United Nations Conference to consider an amendment converting the LTBT into a comprehensive test ban treaty. By August 1989, 41 nations, more than the required one-third of the treaty parties, had joined the request. Although the conference was overshadowed by developments in Iran's war with Iraq, participants voted 74 to 2 (with 19 abstentions) to mandate the President of the Conference to make progress and reconvene at an appropriate time.
15. See for example "The New Nuclear Threat" by John M. Deutch, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, p.120-134.


Nuclear Testing and Nonproliferation

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